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Abstract. In STOC’08, Peikert and Waters introduced a new powerful
primitive called lossy trapdoor functions (LTDFs) and a richer abstrac-
tion called all-but-one trapdoor functions (ABO-TDFs). They also pre-
sented a black-box construction of CCA-secure PKE from an LTDF and
an ABO-TDF. An important component of their construction is the use
of a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme for CCA-security.
In this paper, we introduce the notion of chameleon ABO-TDFs,
which is a special kind of ABO-TDFs. We give a generic as well as a
concrete construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs. Based on an LTDF and
a chameleon ABO-TDF, we presented a black-box construction, free of
one-time signature, of variant of the CCA secure PKE proposed by Peik-
ert and Waters.
Keywords: Chosen Ciphertext Security, Lossy Trapdoor Functions,
Chameleon All-But-One Trapdoor Functions.
1 Introduction
Chosen-ciphertext security (CCA-security, for short) [33,14] is now considered
as a standard notion of security for public key encryption (PKE) in practice.
Numerous CCA-secure PKE schemes in the standard model, under both speciﬁc
hardness assumption and general assumption, have been constructed over the
years following several structural approaches.
The ﬁrst approach for constructing CCA-secure PKE schemes was put for-
ward by Naor and Yung [28]. As explained in [17], the approach employs a
“two key” construction, where the well-formedness of a ciphertext is guaran-
teed by a (simulation-sound) non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proof. The
two-key/NIZK paradigm has led to CCA-secure PKE schemes based on general
assumption [14], such as trapdoor permutations, and eﬃcient schemes based
on speciﬁc number theoretic assumptions [12,13], such as the decisional Diﬃe-
Hellman (DDH) and composite residuosity assumptions.
Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [10] presented another approach for constructing
CCA-secure PKE schemes using identity-based encryption (IBE) as a building
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block. The idea is to use, for each encryption, a fresh random veriﬁcation key
of a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme as the “identity” for IBE
encryption. In order to tie the IBE ciphertext to this veriﬁcation key, the cipher-
text is signed using the corresponding signing key. Boneh and Katz [7] improved
the eﬃciency of the scheme by using a MAC instead of a strongly unforgeable
one-time signature. Some other eﬀorts [8,25] further improved the eﬃciency.
The PKE schemes in [10,7,8,25] follow a similar method in the proof simula-
tion. After the setup phase there is a certain set of well-formed ciphertexts that
the simulator can decrypt corresponding to “identities” that the simulator knows
the private keys. The remaining well-formed ciphertexts, that the simulator can-
not decrypt corresponding to “identities” for which the simulator does not know
the private keys, can be used as challenge ciphertexts in the simulation.
Recently, Peikert and Waters [31] introduced a new primitive called lossy
trapdoor functions (LTDFs) and a richer abstraction called all-but-one trapdoor
functions (ABO-TDFs). Peikert and Waters [31] constructed an elegant CCA-
secure PKE scheme in a black-box manner based on an LTDF and an ABO-TDF.
The scheme can be viewed as an application of the two-key paradigm [28], and the
proof of security is similar to that of the IBE-based schemes [10]. An important
component of their construction is the use of a strongly unforgeable one-time
signature scheme for CCA-security, similar to that of Canetti, Halevi, and Katz
[10]. This paper is motivated by improving the CCA-secure PKE construction
of Peikert and Waters [31].
1.1 Our Contributions
Chameleon all-but-one TDFs. We introduce the notion of chameleon all-
but-one TDFs (ABO-TDFs), which is a special kind of ABO-TDFs.
In an ABO-TDFs collection [31], each function has several branches. Almost
all the branches are injective trapdoor functions, except for one branch which is
lossy. Freeman et al. [18] generalized the deﬁnition of ABO trapdoor functions
by allowing possibly many lossy branches (other than one).
As for chameleon ABO-TDFs, each function has many lossy branches just as
the generalized deﬁnition in [18], but each branch is now represented by a pair
(a, b). The “chameleon” property requires that for each a, it is easy to determine
a unique b to come up with a lossy branch (a, b) with a trapdoor, while it is
computationally indistinguishable to tell a lossy branch (a, b0) from an injective
branch (a, b1) without the trapdoor.
Based on any CPA-secure PKE scheme with some additional property (mostly
additively homomorphism), we propose a generic construction of chameleon
ABO-TDFs. We can construct a chameleon ABO-TDF from any ABO-TDF
in the sense of [31] and a chameleon hash function [24] targeting to the branch
set. Yet the properties of the chameleon hash are a bit overkill for what we need
and we build the needed properties directly into the constructions for better eﬃ-
ciency. In our construction, each chameleon ABO-TDF takes as input ((a, b), x),
and outputs a ciphertext, which is an encryption of x(axa + bxb + xd), where
xa, xb, xd are the trapdoor and the encryptions of xa, xb, xd using the CPA-secure
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PKE scheme are the public parameters of the function. Note that, due to the
homomorphism of the CPA-secure PKE scheme, the chameleon ABO-TDF can
be computed publicly. If (a, b) is a lossy branch, the chameleon ABO-TDF out-
puts an encryption of 0. Given a, with the trapdoor xa, xb, xd, one can compute
b = (−axa−xd) ·xb−1, where (a, b) is a lossy branch. This computation requires
that the message space of the PKE scheme is a ﬁnite ﬁeld. In previous construc-
tions of ABO-TDFs [31,18], each ABO-TDF takes as input (b, x), and outputs a
ciphertext, which is an encryption of x(b− b∗), where an encryption of b∗ is the
public parameter. The only lossy branch is b = b∗, and the ABO-TDF outputs
an encryption of 0.
We also show how to instantiate the generic construction based on the
Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme [15]. In fact, it is easy to transform the
DDH-based all-but-one trapdoor function proposed by Freeman et al. [18] into
a chameleon ABO-TDF using the same technique in our generic construction of
chameleon ABO-TDFs.
CCA-secure PKE. We present a black-box construction of CCA-secure PKE
based on an LTDF and a chameleon ABO-TDF. Our construction does not re-
quire strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme, but a collision-resistant
hash function, making it more eﬃcient than that of Peikert and Waters [31].
The security proof of the construction does not rely on random oracles (RO)
[5]. We follow a similar method of Peikert and Waters [31] in the proof simulation.
In the security proof of Peikert and Waters’s construction, when the adversary
issues decryption queries, with overwhelming probability, the ABO-TDF works
as an injective trapdoor function and the simulator uses the corresponding trap-
door to respond. In the challenge phase, the ABO-TDF works in lossy branch
and the encrypted message is information hidden from the adversary. Because
the ABO-TDF of Peikert and Waters has only one lossy branch, the simula-
tor needs to know the lossy branch before the challenge phase and it resorts to
strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme.
In our CCA-secure PKE construction, the ABO-TDF is replaced by a
chameleon ABO-TDF. Each chameleon ABO-TDF has many lossy branches
(other than one) and each branch is represented by a pair (a, b). In our scheme,
the ﬁrst component of a branch a is correlated with the encrypted message, but
b is independent of the message. Now, in the proof simulation, when the adver-
sary submits the challenge messages, the simulator ﬁrst computes a∗, which is
correlated with the challenge messages, and computes b∗ with the trapdoor of
the chameleon ABO-TDF to make the branch (a∗, b∗) lossy. In other words,
the simulator does not need to know the lossy branch before the challenge
phase and it can generate a lossy branch after the adversary submits the chal-
lenge messages, which allows us to remove the requirement of strongly unforge-
able one-time signature scheme. In our proof simulation, the simulator uses the
same method of Peikert and Waters [31] to answer the adversary’s decryption
queries.
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1.2 Related Work
Lossy trapdoor functions (LTDFs) were introduced by Peikert and Waters in
[31]. Since their introduction, LTDFs have found many uses in cryptography.
In particular, Peikert and Waters showed that any LTDF with enough lossiness
can be used to construct an ABO-TDF, which can then be used to achieve
CCA-security. In addition to CCA-secure encryption, LTDFs have been used in
achieving deterministic encryption [3], lossy encryption [30], hedged public key
encryption [2], security against selective opening attacks [4].
Peikert and Waters [31] presented constructions of LTDFs from the Decisional
Diﬃe-Hellman (DDH) assumption and lattice assumptions. Boldyreva et al. [6]
and Freeman et al. [18] gave (identical) eﬃcient constructions of LTDFs from
Paillier’s decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption [29]. Freeman et
al. [18] also gave eﬃcient constructions of LTDFs based on composite residu-
osity assumption and d-Linear assumption [19,34]. Hemenway and Ostrovsky
[20] showed that smooth homomorphic hash proof systems imply LTDFs. Kiltz
et al. [23] showed that the RSA trapdoor function is lossy under the Φ-Hiding
assumption of Cachin et al. [11]. Recently, Boyen and Waters [9] proposed two
new discrete-log-type LTDFs, which are more eﬃcient than earlier comparable
constructions.
Rosen and Segev [32] showed that any collection of injective trapdoor func-
tions that is secure under very natural correlated products can be used to con-
struct a CCA-secure PKE scheme, and demonstrated that any collection of
LTDFs with suﬃcient lossiness yields a collection of injective trapdoor functions
that is secure under natural correlated products.
Mol and Yilek [27] extended the results of [31] and [32] and showed that
only a non-negligible fraction of a single bit of lossiness is suﬃcient for building
CCA-secure PKE schemes.
Hemenway and Ostrovsky [21] studied under which condition a homomor-
phic encryption implies CCA. They showed that a homomorphic encryption
with cyclic plaintexts implies a family of LTDFs, and henceforth a CCA-secure
encryption using the results of Peikert and Waters [31]. Our paper focuses on
eﬃcient construction of CCA-secure systems from families of LTDFs, compared
with the construction of Peikert and Waters [31]. Our result is that we can do
that with a special kind of LTDFs, namely, chameleon ABO-TDFs. A homo-
morphic encryption with cyclic plaintexts is not enough to construct a family of
chameleon ABO-TDFs.
Recently, Kiltz et al. [22] introduced the notion of adaptive trapdoor functions
(ATDFs) and a natural generalization they called tag-based adaptive trapdoor
functions (TB-ATDFs). They showed that ATDFs and TB-ATDFs can be con-
structed directly using lossy+ABO-TDFs. They also showed that ATDFs and
TB-ATDFs are strictly weaker than correlated-product trapdoor functions [32]
and LTDFs [31]. They gave black-box constructions of CCA-secure PKE from
both ATDFs and TB-ATDFs. The construction of CCA-secure PKE from TB-
ATDFs is similar to the construction of Peikert and Waters [31]. But, compared
with [31], one-time signature can be replaced by a MAC using the transform of
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Boneh et al. [7]. They used the hardcore bit of the ATDF to construction one-bit
PKE. But, if the given ATDF is a permutation or has linearly many simulta-
neous hardcore bits, they can use the ATDF as a key-encapsulation mechanism
(KEM) for an CCA-secure symmetric encryption scheme to construction a CCA-
secure PKE. In their construction of ATDF from lossy+ABO-TDF, the branch
of ABO-TDF is the output of a target collision-resistant hash function, which
takes the output of LTDF as input. The branch of ABO-TDF in their construc-
tion of TB-ATDF from lossy+ABO-TDF is a tag chosen randomly. As opposed
to their construction, the ﬁrst component of a branch (a, b) of chameleon ABO-
TDF in our scheme a is chosen randomly, and the second component b is the
output of a collision-resistant hash function, which takes the output of LTDF
and h(x) ⊕ m as inputs, where m is the encrypted message. (Note that, our
construction needs a fully collision resistant hash as opposed to target collision
resistant as in [22].) This technique, which has already used in the RO model
to construct CCA-secure PKE schemes [1], allows us to avoid using one-time
signature, MAC, or other symmetric-key primitives.
Our works are also related to chameleon hash function [24]. Roughly speak-
ing, chameleon hash functions are randomized collision-resistant hash functions
with the additional property that given a trapdoor, one can eﬃciently generate
collisions. Mohassel showed in [26] how to construct one-time signature from
chameleon hash functions, which can be used in the construction of Peikert and
Waters [31].
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some
standard notations and cryptographic deﬁnitions. We introduce the notion of
chameleon ABO-TDFs and present a generic construction and a concrete con-
struction in Section 3. In Section 4, we present black-box constructions of CCA-
secure PKE based on an LTDF and a chameleon ABO-TDF. Finally, we state
our conclusion in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
If S is a set, then |S| denotes its size and s $← S denotes the operation of picking
an element s uniformly at random from S . Let N denote the natural numbers.
If λ ∈ N then 1λ denotes the string of λ ones. Let z ← A(x, y, . . .) denote the
operation of running an algorithm A with inputs (x, y, . . .) and output z. Let
U denote the uniform distribution on -bit binary strings. A function f(λ) is
negligible if for every c > 0 there exists an λc such that f(λ) < 1/λc for all
λ > λc.
2.1 Hashing
Formally, a function H : X → Y is a collision-resistant (CR) hash function, if
for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A, AdvCRA (λ) is negligible
in λ, where
Chameleon All-But-One TDFs and Their Application 233
AdvCRA (λ) = Pr[x, x
′ ← A(H) : x′ = x ∧H(x′) = H(x)].
A family of function H = {hi : X → Y } is pairwise independent, if for every
distinct x, x′ ∈ X and every y, y′ ∈ Y , Pr
h
$←H[h(x) = y and h(x
′) = y′] =
1/|Y |2.
2.2 Extracting Randomness
The min-entropy H∞(X) of a random variable X is − log(maxx Pr(X = x)).
Dodis, Reyzin and Smith [16] deﬁned average min-entropy of X given Y to be
the logarithm of the average probability of the most likely value of X given Y :
H˜∞(X |Y ) = − log
(
Ey←Y
[
2−H∞(X|Y =y)
])
. They proved that if Y has 2 possible
values and Z is any random variable, then H˜∞(X |(Y, Z)) ≥ H∞(X |Z)− .
The statistical distance between two probability distributions X and Y is
SD(X,Y ) = 12
∑
v |Pr(X = v)−Pr(Y = v)|. Dodis, Reyzin and Smith [16] proved
that if X,Y are random variables such that X ∈ {0, 1}n and H˜∞(X |Y ) ≥ k,
and H is a family of pairwise independent hash functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1},
then for h $← H, SD((Y, h, h(X)), (Y, h, U)) ≤  as long as  ≤ k − 2 log(1/).
2.3 Public Key Encryption
A PKE scheme is a tuple of algorithms described as follows:
Kg(λ) takes as input a security parameter λ. It outputs a public/private key
pair (PK, SK).
Enc(PK,m) takes as input a public key PK and a message m. It outputs a
ciphertext.
Dec(SK, c) takes as input a private key SK and a ciphertext c. It outputs a
plaintext message or the special symbol ⊥ meaning that the ciphertext is
invalid.
We insist that all public key encryption schemes satisfy the obvious correctness
condition (that decryption “undoes” encryption).
The strongest and commonly accepted notion of security for a PKE scheme is
that of indistinguishability against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA).
It is deﬁned using the following game between an adversary A and a challenger.
Setup. The challenger runs Kg(λ) to obtain a public/private key pair (PK, SK).
It gives the public key PK to the adversary.
Query phase 1. The adversary A adaptively issues decryption queries c. The
challenger responds with Dec(SK, c).
Challenge. The adversary A submits two (equal length) messages m0,m1. The
challenger selects a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, sets c∗ = Enc(PK,mβ) and sends
c∗ to the adversary as its challenge ciphertext.
Query phase 2. The adversary continues to adaptively issue decryption queries
c, as in Query phase 1, but with the natural constraint that the adversary
does not request the decryption of c∗.
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Guess. The adversary A outputs its guess β′ ∈ {0, 1} for β and wins the game
if β = β′.
We deﬁne A’s advantage in attacking the public key encryption scheme PKE
with the security parameter λ as AdvPKEA (λ) = |Pr[β = β′]− 12 |.
Definition 1. A public key encryption scheme PKE is CCA secure, if for all
polynomial-time adversary A, the advantage AdvPKEA (λ) is negligible.
The chosen-plaintext security CPA for a public key encryption scheme can be
deﬁned as the preceding game, except that adversary A is disallowed to issue
any decryption query.
2.4 Lossy Trapdoor Functions
Informally, a collection of LTDFs is a collection of functions with two computa-
tionally indistinguishable branches: an injective branch with a trapdoor and a
lossy branch losing information about its input.
Definition 2 (Lossy Trapdoor Functions). A collection of (n, k)-lossy trap-
door functions is a 3-tuple of (possibly probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms
(G,F,F−1) such that:
1. Sampling an injective function: G(1λ, injective) outputs (s, td) where s is
a function index and td is its trapdoor. The algorithm F(s, ·) computes a (de-
terministic) injective function fs(·) over the domain {0, 1}n, and F−1(s, td, ·)
computes f−1s (·).
2. Sampling a lossy function: G(1λ, lossy) outputs s where s is a function
index. The algorithm F(s, ·) computes a (deterministic) function fs(·) over
the domain {0, 1}n whose image has size at most 2n−k.
3. Hard to distinguish injective from lossy: The ensembles {s : (s, td) ←
G(1λ, injective)}λ∈N and {s : s ← G(1λ, lossy)}λ∈N are computationally indis-
tinguishable.
3 Chameleon ABO-TDFs and Its Constructions
In this section, we ﬁrst introduce our notion of chameleonABO-TDFs.Then, based
on a CPA-secure pubic key encryption scheme with some additional property, we
propose a generic construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs. Finally, we instantiate
the generic construction using the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme [15].
3.1 Chameleon ABO-TDFs
The notion of ABO-TDFs, introduced by Peikert and Waters [31], is a richer
abstraction of LTDFs. In an ABO collection, each function has several branches.
Almost all the branches are injective trapdoor functions, except for one branch
which is lossy. Freeman et al. [18] generalized the deﬁnition of ABO-TDFs by
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allowing possibly many lossy branches (other than one). Let B = {Bλ}λ∈N be
a collection of sets whose elements represent the branches, and we recall the
deﬁnition of ABO-TDFs [18].
Definition 3(All-But-One Trapdoor Functions). A collection of (n, k)-all-but-
one trapdoor functions is a 3-tuple of (possibly probabilistic) polynomial-time
algorithms (Gabo,Fabo,F−1abo) such that:
1. Sampling a function: For any λ ∈ N and b∗ ∈ Bλ, Gabo(1λ, b∗) outputs
(s, td, S˜) where s is a function index, td is its trapdoor and S˜ is a set of lossy
branches with b∗ ∈ S˜ ⊂ Bλ.
2. Evaluation of injective functions: For any b ∈ Bλ, if b /∈ S˜ where
(s, td, S˜) ← Gabo(1λ, b∗), then Fabo(s, b, ·) computes a (deterministic) injec-
tive function fs,b(·) over the domain {0, 1}n, and F−1abo(s, td, b, ·) computes
f−1s,b (·).
3. Evaluation of lossy functions: For any b ∈ Bλ, if b ∈ S˜ where (s, td, S˜) ←
Gabo(1λ, b∗), then Fabo(s, b, ·) computes a (deterministic) function fs,b(·) over
the domain {0, 1}n whose image has size at most 2n−k.
4. Security: The ensembles {s : (s, td, S˜) ← Gabo(1λ, b∗1)}λ∈N,b∗1∈Bλ and {s :
(s, td, S˜)← Gabo(1λ, b∗2)}λ∈N,b∗2∈Bλ are computationally indistinguishable.
5. Hard to find one-more lossy branch: Any probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm A that receives (s, b) as input, where (s, td, S˜) ← Gabo(1λ, b∗) and
b
$← S˜, has only a negligible probability of outputting an element b′ ∈ S˜\{b}.
We are now ready to introduce the notion of chameleon ABO-TDFs, which is a
speciﬁc kind of ABO-TDFs with two variable (a, b) as a branch. The property
we require is that given any a, it is easy to determine a unique lossy branch
(a, b) with the help of a trapdoor, while (a, b0) from a lossy branch family is
computationally indistinguishable from (a, b1) from an injective branch family
with the trapdoor. We can construct a chameleon ABO-TDF from any ABO-
TDF in the sense of [31] and a chameleon hash function [24] targeting to the
branch set. Yet the properties of the chameleon hash are a bit overkill for what
we need and we build the needed properties directly into the constructions for
better eﬃciency.
Let A × B = {Aλ × Bλ}λ∈N be a collection of sets whose elements represent
the branches.
Definition 4 (Chameleon All-But-One Trapdoor Functions). A collection of
(n, k)-chameleon all-but-one trapdoor functions is a 4-tuple of (possibly proba-
bilistic) polynomial-time algorithms (Gch,Fch,F−1ch ,CLBch) such that:
1. Sampling a function: For any λ ∈ N, Gch(1λ) outputs (s, td, S˜) where s
is a function index, td is its trapdoor and S˜ ⊂ Aλ × Bλ is a set of lossy
branches.
Note that, a lossy branch is speciﬁed as a parameter to the function
sampler of an ABO collection, but we have no such requirement.
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2. Evaluation of injective functions: For any (a, b) ∈ Aλ×Bλ, if (a, b) /∈ S˜
where (s, td, S˜)← Gch(1λ), then Fch(s, a, b, ·) computes a (deterministic) in-
jective function gs,a,b(·) over the domain {0, 1}n, and F−1ch (s, td, a, b, ·) com-
putes g−1s,a,b(·).
3. Evaluation of lossy functions: For any (a, b) ∈ Aλ×Bλ, if (a, b) ∈ S˜ where
(s, td, S˜) ← Gch(1λ), then Fch(s, a, b, ·) computes a (deterministic) function
gs,a,b(·) over the domain {0, 1}n whose image has size at most 2n−k.
4. Chameleon property:
(a) Computing a lossy branch: For any a ∈ Aλ, CLBch(s, td, a) computes
a unique b ∈ Bλ to result in a lossy branch (a, b). The uniqueness of b
for a given a implies that any randomly chosen branch from Aλ ×Bλ is
injective with overwhelming probability.
(b) Hard to distinguish a lossy branch from an injective branch: Any
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithmA that receives s as input, where
(s, td, S˜) ← Gch(1λ), has only a negligible probability of distinguishing
a pair (a, b0) ∈ S˜ from (a, b1) /∈ S˜, even a is chosen by A. Formally, Let
A = (A1,A2) be a CH-LI distinguisher and deﬁne its advantage as
AdvCH-LIA (λ) =
∣
∣
∣∣
∣
∣
∣
Pr
⎡
⎢
⎣β = β′ :
(s, td, S˜) ← Gch(1λ); a ← A1(s);
b0 = CLBch(s, td, a); b1
$← Bλ;
β
$← {0, 1};β′← A2(s, a, bβ)
⎤
⎥
⎦− 12
∣
∣
∣∣
∣
∣
∣
.
Given a collection of chameleon all-but-one trapdoor functions, it is hard
to distinguish a lossy branch from an injective branch, if AdvCH-LIA (·) is
negligible for every PPT distinguisher A. This property implies that
given a, without the trapdoor, the component b of the lossy branch (a, b)
is distributed uniformly.
5. Hard to find one-more lossy branch: Any probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm A that receives (s, a, b) as input, where (s, td, S˜) ← Gch(1λ) and
(a, b) $← S˜, has only a negligible probability of outputting a pair (a′, b′) ∈
S˜\{(a, b)}. This property implies that the size of S˜ should not be too small.
In [31], Peikert and Waters also introduced a slightly relaxed deﬁnition of LTDFs,
which they called almost-always LTDFs. Namely, there is only a negligible prob-
ability that fs(·) is not injective or that F−1(s, td, ·) incorrectly computes f−1s (·)
for some input.
Similarly, we deﬁne almost-always chameleon ABO-TDFs. In a almost-always
chameleon ABO-TDFs, with overwhelming probability, F−1ch (s, td, a, b, ·) inverts
correctly on all values in the image of gs,a,b(·) if (a, b) /∈ S˜, and CLBch(s, td, a)
outputs b such that (a, b) ∈ S˜.
3.2 Generic Construction
Let (Kg,Enc,Dec) be a CPA-secure PKE scheme, which is additively homomor-
phic. For the PKE scheme, we also assume that
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1. M is its message space and R is its randomness space. Both spaces are large
enough and |M| > |R|.
2. M is a ﬁnite ﬁeld. For constructing almost-always chameleon ABO-TDFs,
we only require that, M is a commutative ring with multiplicative identity
and, with overwhelming probability, each element in M has multiplicative
inverse (See the concrete construction in Section 3.3.).
3. Enc(PK,m)Enc(PK,m′) = Enc(PK,m+m′), where (PK, SK) ← Kg(λ),m,
m′ ∈ M, and  denotes coordinate-wise multiplication of ciphertexts.
4. For a,m ∈ M, (Enc(PK,m))a = Enc(PK, am), where exponentiation of a
ciphertext is also coordinate-wise.
Now, we deﬁne a 4-tuple algorithms (Gch,Fch,F−1ch ,CLBch) as follows:
1. Sampling a function: Gch takes as input 1λ, where λ is a security pa-
rameter. It ﬁrst generates a keypair for the public key encryption scheme:
(PK, SK)← Kg(λ). It then chooses xa, xb, xd $←M and computes
ca = Enc(PK, xa), cb = Enc(PK, xb), cd = Enc(PK, xd).
The function index is s = (PK, ca, cb, cd), the trapdoor is td = (SK, xa, xb, xd)
and the set of lossy branches S˜ is all pairs (a, b) ∈ M × M such that
axa + bxb + xd = 0.
2. Evaluating a function: Fch takes as input (s, a, b, x), where s = (PK, ca, cb,
cd) is a function index and x ∈ M. It computes y =
(
(ca)a  (cb)b  cd
)x
,
and outputs y.
3. Inverting an injective function: F−1ch takes as input (s, td, a, b, y), where
s = (PK, ca, cb, cd) is a function index, td = (SK, xa, xb, xd) is the trap-
door and (a, b) /∈ S˜. It computes x = Dec(SK, y) · (axa + bxb + xd)−1, and
outputs x.
4. Computing a lossy branch: CLBch takes as input (s, td, a), where s =
(PK, ca, cb, cd) is a function index and td = (SK, xa, xb, xd) is the trapdoor.
It computes b = (−axa − xd) · xb−1, and outputs b.
Theorem 1. The algorithms described above give a collection of (log |M|,
log |M| − log |R|)-chameleon all-but-one trapdoor functions.
Proof. We observe that, if (a, b) is not a lossy branch, namely b = CLBch(s, td,
a) = (−axa − xd) · xb−1, then Fch(s, a, b, x) computes
y =
(
(ca)a  (cb)b  cd
)x
=
(
(Enc(PK, xa))
a  (Enc(PK, xb))b  Enc(PK, xd)
)x
= Enc(PK, x(axa + bxb + xd)),
and F−1ch (s, td, a, b, y) computes
Dec(SK, y) · (axa + bxb + xd)−1 = Dec(SK,Enc(PK, x(axa + bxb + xd)))
·(axa + bxb + xd)−1
= x(axa + bxb + xd) · (axa + bxb + xd)−1 = x.
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So, we have shown invertibility for injective functions via the trapdoor informa-
tion. Next, we show that if (a, b) is a lossy branch, namely b = CLBch(s, td, a) =
(−axa−xd) ·x−1b , then Fch evaluates a lossy function. In this case, Fch computes
(
(ca)a  (cb)b  cd
)x
=
(
(Enc(PK, xa))
a  (Enc(PK, xb))b  Enc(PK, xd)
)x
= Enc(PK, 0),
and most of the information on the input is lost. The function Fch(s, a, b, ·)
is deﬁned over the domain M, and if (a, b) ∈ S˜, Fch is a lossy function and
the image size is at most |R|. Therefore the amount of lossiness is at least
log |M| − log |R|.
Given the public key encryption scheme (Kg,Enc,Dec) is CPA secure, it is easy
to see that any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A has only a negligible
probability of distinguishing a pair (a, b0) ∈ S˜ from (a, b1) /∈ S˜, even a is chosen
by A.
Finally, we show that any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A that
receives (s, a, b) as input, where (a, b) ∈ S˜, has only a negligible probability of
outputting a pair (a′, b′) ∈ S˜\{(a, b)}. To see this, observe that the values xa, xb
and xd are initially hidden by the CPA secure public key encryption scheme.
A could obtain the information that axa + bxb + xd = 0. However, there are
exactly |M|2 pairs that satisfy this equation and each of them are equally likely.
Thus, the adversary can output a pair (a′, b′) satisfying (a′, b′) = (a, b) and
a′xa + b′xb + xd = 0 with negligible probability.
The formal proofs of the hardness of distinguishing a lossy branch from an
injective branch of the chameleon ABO-TDFs, which can be reduced to the CPA
security of the PKE scheme, and the hardness of ﬁnding one-more lossy branch,
which can be reduced to the one-wayness of the PKE scheme, will be given in
the full version of the paper.
3.3 A Concrete Construction
Based on the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme [15], which is additively homo-
morphic, we present a concrete construction of almost-always chameleon ABO-
TDFs by instantiating the generic construction. We begin with a brief description
of the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme [15], and then describe our construction.
Consider a modulus N = PQ, where P and Q are odd primes and
gcd(N,φ(N)) = 1. Such an N is called admissible by Damg˚ard and Jurik [15].
The following theorem was proved in [15]:
Theorem 2. For any admissible N and a natural number  < P,Q, the map
ψ : ZN × Z∗N → Z∗N+1 defined by ψ(x, r) = (1 + N)xrN

mod N +1 is an
isomorphism, where
ψ(x1 + x2 mod N , r1r2 mod N) = ψ(x1, r1) · ψ(x2, r2) mod N +1.
Moreover, it can be inverted in polynomial time given lcm(P − 1, Q− 1).
Chameleon All-But-One TDFs and Their Application 239
The following describes the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme [15].
DJ.Kg(λ) Given the security parameter λ, choose an admissible modulus N =
PQ and a natural number  < P,Q. The published public key is PK = (N, ),
and the private key is SK = lcm(P − 1, Q− 1).
DJ.Enc(PK,m) Given PK and a message m ∈ ZN , choose r $← Z∗N and output
c = (1 + N)mrN

mod N +1.
DJ.Dec(SK, c) Given SK = lcm(P − 1, Q − 1) and a ciphertext c, apply the
inversion algorithm provided by Theorem 2 to compute (m, r) = ψ−1 (SK, c),
and output m.
Damg˚ard and Jurik [15] also proved that based on decisional composite residu-
osity assumption, the encryption scheme described above is CPA secure.
Now, given a Damg˚ard and Jurik encryption scheme with algorithms DJ.Kg,
DJ.Enc and DJ.Dec, we deﬁne a 4-tuple algorithms (Gch,Fch,F−1ch ,CLBch) as
follows:
1. Sampling a function: Gch takes as input 1λ, where λ is a security pa-
rameter. It runs (PK, SK) ← DJ.Kg(λ), where PK = (N, ), and chooses
xa, xb, xd
$← ZN . Next, it computes
ca = DJ.Enc(PK, xa), cb = DJ.Enc(PK, xb), cd = DJ.Enc(PK, xd).
The function index is s = (PK, ca, cb, cd), the trapdoor is td = (SK, xa, xb, xd)
and the set of lossy branches S˜ is all pairs (a, b) ∈ ZN × ZN such that
axa + bxb + xd = 0 mod N .
2. Evaluating a function: Fch takes as input (s, a, b, x), where s = (N, , ca,
cb, cd), a, b, x ∈ ZN . It computes y =
(
(ca)a · (cb)b · cd
)x mod N +1, and
outputs y.
3. Inverting an injective function: F−1ch takes as input (s, td, a, b, y), where
s = (N, , ca, cb, cd), td = (SK, xa, xb, xd) and (a, b) /∈ S˜. It computes
x′ = DJ.Dec(SK, y),
and outputs x = x′ · (axa + bxb + xd)−1 mod N .
Note that, with overwhelming probability, (axa + bxb + xd) mod N  has
multiplicative inverse.
4. Computing a lossy branch: CLBch takes as input (s, td, a), where s =
(N, , ca, cb, cd), td = (SK, xa, xb, xd) and a ∈ ZN . It computes
b = (−axa − xd) · xb−1 mod N ,
and outputs b.
Theorem 3. Under the composite residuosity assumption, the algorithms de-
scribed above give a collection of ((n−1), (n−1)−n)-almost-always chameleon
all-but-one trapdoor functions.
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Proof. The CPA security of the Damg˚ard-Jurik encryption scheme and Theorem
1 guarantee that the algorithms described above give a collection of almost-
always chameleon ABO-TDFs. Thus, it only remains to bound the amount of
lossiness.
The function Fch(s, a, b, ·) is deﬁned over the domain {0, 1}(n−1), and if
(a, b) ∈ S˜, Fch is a lossy function and the image size is at most 2n. Therefore
the amount of lossiness is at least (n− 1)− n.
4 CCA-Secure PKE Scheme
Let (G,F,F−1) be a collection of (n, k1)-lossy trapdoor functions, and let
(Gch,Fch,F−1ch ,CLBch) be a collection of (n, k2)-chameleon all-but-one trapdoor
functions having branches A×B = {Aλ×Bλ}λ∈N. Let H be a family of pairwise
independent hash functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}.
We assume that the public key encryption scheme has message space {0, 1}.
We also require that k1+k2−n ≥ k for some k = ω(logn), and  ≤ k−2 log(1/)
for some negligible  (in λ).
Our PKE scheme consists of the following algorithms:
Kg(λ) Given the security parameter λ, generate an injective trapdoor func-
tion: (s, td) ← G(1λ, injective). Then generate a chameleon all-but-one trap-
door function:(s′, td′) ← Gch(1λ). Finally, choose a collision-resistant hash
function H : {0, 1}∗ → Aλ and h $← H. The published public key is
PK = (s, s′, H, h), and the private key is SK = (td, td′).
Enc(PK,m) Given PK and a message m ∈ {0, 1}, choose x $← {0, 1}n, r $← Bλ
and compute c0 = h(x) ⊕ m, c1 = F(s, x), c2 = Fch(s′, t, r, x), where t =
H(c0, c1). Finally, output the ciphertext c = (c0, c1, c2, r).
Dec(SK, c) Given SK = (td, td′) and a ciphertext c = (c0, c1, c2, r), compute
x = F−1(s, td, c1) and t = H(c0, c1). Then check whether
c1 = F(s, x) and c2 = Fch(s′, t, r, x).
If not, output ⊥, else output m = c0 ⊕ h(x).
It is clear that the above construction satisﬁes correctness. Our construction does
not require strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. Compared with the
scheme of Peikert and Waters [31], the ciphertext is compact without attached
signature and decryption does not require performing signature veriﬁcation. We
now turn to security.
Theorem 4. The algorithms (Kg,Enc,Dec) described above are a public key en-
cryption scheme secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
Proof. The proof is a sequence of games [35], Game0,Game1, . . . ,Game5, where
Game0 is the original adaptive chosen ciphertext attack game. Then we show
that for all i = 0, . . . , 4, Gamei and Gamei+1 are (computationally) indistin-
guishable. Finally, we make an unconditional argument that an adversary must
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have negligible advantage in Game5. It follows that the public key encryption
scheme is CCA-secure.
Game1. We modify the way that the challenger computes the challenge cipher-
text c∗ = (c∗0, c
∗
1, c
∗
2, r
∗) as
c∗0 = h(x
∗)⊕mβ, c∗1 = F(s, x∗), c∗2 = Fch(s′, t∗, r∗, x∗),
where x∗ $← {0, 1}n, t∗ = H(c∗0, c∗1) and r∗ = CLBch(s′, td′, t∗).
Game2. We modify the decryption oracle so that it rejects all ciphertexts c =
(c0, c1, c2, r), such that r = r∗ and t = H(c0, c1) = t∗.
Game3. We modify the decryption oracle so that it applies the following special
rejection rule: if the adversary submits a ciphertext c = (c0, c1, c2, r) for
decryption, such that r = CLBch(s′, td′, t), where t = H(c0, c1), then the
decryption oracle immediately outputs reject and halts.
Game4. This game is identical to Game3, except for a small modiﬁcation
to the decryption oracle. When the adversary submits a ciphertext c =
(c0, c1, c2, r) for decryption, the challenger computes x = F−1ch (s
′, td′, c2) and
t = H(c0, c1). Then it checks whether
c1 = F(s, x) and c2 = Fch(s′, t, r, x).
If not, it outputs ⊥, else outputs m = c0 ⊕ h(x).
Game5. In this game, we replace the injective function with a lossy one. For-
mally, in the Setup phase, we replace (s, td) ← G(1λ, injective) with s ←
G(1λ, lossy).
Claim 1. Game0 and Game1 are computationally indistinguishable, given the
hardness of distinguishing a lossy branch from an injective branch of the
chameleon all-but-one trapdoor functions collection.
Proof. We prove this claim by describing a CH-LI distinguisher algorithm A =
(A1,A2) that receives s′ as input where (s′, td′) ← Gch(1λ). The distinguisher
A interacts with the adversary as follows.
In the Setup phase, A runs (s, td) ← G(1λ, injective), and chooses a collision-
resistant hash function H and h $← H. The public key is PK = (s, s′, H, h).
We point out that A knows the injective trapdoor td, but does not know the
trapdoor td′ corresponding to s′.
When the adversary issues decryption queries, A responds using the injective
trapdoor td. Note that, the only secret information that the decryption oracle
needs to operate is td, which A knows.
When the adversary submits two (equal length) messages m0,m1, A ﬂips a
fair coin β ∈ {0, 1} and constructs the challenge ciphertext as follows:
1. It chooses x∗ $← {0, 1}n and computes
c∗0 = h(x
∗)⊕mβ , c∗1 = F(s, x∗), t∗ = H(c∗0, c∗1).
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2. Next, A1 submits t∗ and sets the response as r∗. Then, it computes c∗2 =
Fch(s′, t∗, r∗, x∗).
3. Finally, it outputs the ciphertext c∗ = (c∗0, c
∗
1, c
∗
2, r
∗).
When r∗ = CLBch(s′, td′, t∗), A simulates Game1 perfectly; otherwise, it simu-
lates Game0. Therefore, any diﬀerence in behavior between Game0 and Game1
immediately breaks the hardness of distinguishing a lossy branch from an injec-
tive branch of the chameleon all-but-one trapdoor functions collection.
Claim 2. Game1 and Game2 are computationally indistinguishable, given the
collision-resistant property of the hash function H.
Proof. We observe that Game1 and Game2 behave equivalently unless an event
E happens, which is that the adversary makes a legal (i.e., not equal to c∗)
decryption query of the form c = (c0, c1, c2, r = r∗), where t∗ = H(c0, c1). We
show that event E happens with negligible probability.
If event E happens, then because c = c∗ we must have (c0, c1) = (c∗0, c∗1) and
H(c0, c1) = H(c∗0, c
∗
1) = t
∗. Therefore, we ﬁnd a collision of the hash function H .
Because the hash function H is collision-resistant, we conclude that E happens
with negligible probability.
Claim 3. Game2 and Game3 are computationally indistinguishable, given the
hardness of finding one-more lossy branch of the chameleon all-but-one trapdoor
functions collection.
Proof. We deﬁne the event F to be the event that the adversary makes a legal
(i.e., not equal to c∗) decryption query of the form c = (c0, c1, c2, r), such that
r = CLBch(s′, td′, t), where t = H(c0, c1). It is clear that Game2 and Game3
proceed identically until event F occurs. We show that event F happens with
negligible probability.
Note that, if c = c∗ and (t, r) = (t∗, r∗), the decryption oracle rejects the
ciphertext in both games. Therefore, if even F happens, then (t, r) is a new
lossy branch of the chameleon all-but-one trapdoor function.
Because of the hardness of ﬁnding one-more lossy branch of the chameleon
all-but-one trapdoor functions collection, we conclude that F happens with
negligible probability.
Claim 4. Game3 and Game4 are equivalent.
Proof. The only diﬀerence between Game3 and Game4 is in the implementation
of decryption oracle. We show that decryption oracle is equivalent in the two
games.
In both games, when the adversary makes a legal (i.e., not equal to c∗) de-
cryption query of the form c = (c0, c1, c2, r), where t = H(c0, c1), the challenger
checks that c1 = F(s, x) and c2 = Fch(s′, t, r, x) for some x that they compute
(in diﬀerent ways), and outputs ⊥ if not.
Note that, if r = CLBch(s′, td′, t), the decryption oracle outputs rejects and halts
in both games. Therefore, F(s, ·) and Fch(s′, t, r, ·) are both injective, and there is
a unique x such that (c1, c2) = (F(s, x),Fch(s′, t, r, x)). Game3 ﬁnds that x by
computing F−1(s, td, c1), while Game4 ﬁnds it by computing F−1ch (s
′, td′, t, r, c2).
Chameleon All-But-One TDFs and Their Application 243
Claim 5. Game4 and Game5 are computationally indistinguishable, given the
hardness of distinguishing injective functions from lossy functions of the lossy
trapdoor functions collection.
Proof. The only diﬀerence between Game4 and Game5 is in the Setup phase. In
the Setup phase of Game4, the challenger proceeds as in the original CCA game,
outputting the public key PK = (s, s′, H, h) where (s, td) ← G(1λ, injective)
and (s′, td′) ← Gch(1λ). In Game5, Setup generates a lossy function instead,
outputting PK = (s, s′, H, h) where s ← G(1λ, lossy) and (s′, td′)← Gch(1λ).
We point out that the challenger knows the trapdoor td′ of the chameleon
all-but-one trapdoor function, but does not know the trapdoor td corresponding
to s (if it even exists). The only secret information that the decryption oracle
needs to operate is td′, which the challenger knows.
It is straightforward to show that the adversary’s views in the two games are
indistinguishable, using the indistinguishability of injective and lossy functions.
Claim 6. No (even unbounded) adversary has more than a negligible advantage
in Game5.
We prove this claim by showing the fact that the value h(x∗) is a nearly uniform
and independent “one-time pad”, and therefore the adversary has negligible
advantage in guessing which message was encrypted.
Note that, in Game5, both F(s, ·) and Fch(s′, t∗, r∗, ·) are lossy functions, and
its image size is at most 2n−k1 and 2n−k2 , respectively. By the hypothesis that
k1 + k2−n ≥ k, we have that the random variable (c∗1, c∗2) = (F(s, x∗),Fch(s′, t∗,
r∗, x∗)) can take at most 22n−k1−k2 ≤ 2n−k values.
Because x∗ and h are independent, We also have H˜∞(x∗|(c∗1, c∗2, h)) ≥
H∞(x∗|h) − (n − k) = k. Therefore, we have that (c∗1, c∗2, h, h(x∗))
and(c∗1, c
∗
2, h, U) are within  in statistical distance by our requirement that
 ≤ k − 2 log(1/), and we are done.
5 Conclusions
We introduced a new primitive called chameleon ABO-TDFs, which is a special
kind of ABO-LTDFs. Given a CPA-secure public key encryption scheme with some
additional property (mostly additively homomorphism), we also gave a generic
and concrete construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs. Based on an LTDF and a
chameleon ABO-TDF, we proposed a black-box construction of CCA-secure PKE
which is more eﬃcient than that of Peikert and Waters [31]. A future direction is
to ﬁnd other constructions and applications of chameleon ABO-TDFs.
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